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Abstract: This article argues that the so-called sharia-
inspired regulations have been locally fitted through 
democratic processes that engaged together the elected 
legislative body and the executive office as well as various 
social groups. It bases on a qualitative fieldwork in Cianjur, 
a district in West Java Indonesia. There are three 
underpinning factors to the fitted sharia. First, it is possible 
because the discursive elements of sharia that enabled the 
Islamists to find a local and perhaps diluted, and more 
moderate formulation of sharia. Second, social diversity 
with no single group predominating required compromise 
and political alliance within and between the Islamist and 
non-Islamist groups. Third, the so-called sharia has number 
of secular functions related to politics, economy, and local 
custom that eventually brought the contesting groups to 
compromise. Thus, the resurgence of the sharia-inspired 
regulation is driven by various factors ranging from 
religiosity and piety to the practical and pragmatic reasons. 
Keywords: Sharia, Democracy, Islamism. 
 
Introduction 
The development of democracy has eventually brought Indonesia 
as the only country considered ‘free’ in Southeast Asia. 1  The UK 
Guardian used the term “miracle” to describe the development of 
democracy in Indonesia in the post-Suharto era.2 However, in recent 
years, many observers have showed defects and shortcomings of 
                                                                
1 Freedom House, “Indonesia,” Freedom in the World, 2013, http://www.freedom-
house.org/report/freedom-world/2013/indonesia. 
2  Kishore Mahbubani, “Kishore Mahbubani: Indonesia’s Democratic Miracle,” the 
Guardian, September 19, 2008, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/-
sep/19/indonesia.terrorism. 
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Indonesian democracy. Aspinall and Mietzner states it still far from 
ideal. It still has structural problems, especially corruption and weak 
law enforcement.3 Freedman and Tiburzi add three more problems of 
Indonesian democracy; military abuses, protection of minorities and 
Islamic radicalism.4 In commemorating twenty years of post-Suharto’s 
democracy, several media highlighted the retreat or set back of 
Indonesian democracy.5 Among the issue is the position of Islam as 
religion of the majority play in this democratic arrangement.6   
As a country with Muslim majority population, the question 
between Islam and democracy is always on the table with mixed 
answers.7 One of the answers has been the the issuance of sharia-
related regulations. Between the year 1999-2012, somewhere between 
seventy-eight and 160 sharia-related regulations or bylaws are approved 
and enacted in many regents and municipalities across Indonesia.8 The 
persistence of development of democracy along with the growth of 
shariatization9 would put into question some dominant contemporary 
                                                                
3 Edward Aspinal and Marcus Mietzner (eds), Problems of Democratization in Indonesia: 
Elections, Institutions and Society (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010), p. 
2  
4 Amy Frredman and Robert Tiburzi, “Progress and caution: Indonesia’s Democracy”, 
Asian Affairs: An America Review, vol 39 (2012), p. 131. 
5 See for instance, Editorial Notes, ‘Indonesian democracy in Retreat: The Jakarta 
Post’, The Strait Times, 5 of February 2018, https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-
asia/indonesian-democracy-in-retreat-the-jakarta-post and Krithika varagur, ‘20 Years 
on, Indonesia Considers Legacy of Its 'Reformation',  voice of America, 23 of May 
2018, https://www.voanews.com/a/years-on-indonesia-considers-legacy-of-its-refor-
mation-/4406183.html  
6 For short review of this topic, please refer to Masdar Hilmy, Islamism and Democracy in 
Indonesia: Piety and Pragmatism, (Singapore: ISEAS - Yusof Ishak Institute, 2010). 
7 Thomas B. Pepinski, “Measuring piety in Indonesia”, paper presented at the 2016 
AALIMS Conference on the Political Economy of Islam and Muslim Societies (2016), 
pp. 32-33.  
8 Robin Bush, “Regional Sharia Regulations in Indonesia: Anomaly of Symptom?,” in 
Expressing Islam: Religious Life and Politics in Indonesia, 2008, 176; Michael Buehler, 
“Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties: Comparing Shari’a Politics in Two 
Indonesian Provinces,” Comparative Politics 46, no. 1 (October 1, 2013): 67, 
https://doi.org/10.5129/001041513807709347. 
9 The term shariatization was first employed by Olivier Roy in his book the Failure of 
Political Islam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1994). In 
Indonesian context this term is used by M. Nur Ikhwan in his article entitled “The 
Politics of Shariatization: Central Governmental and Regional Discourses of Shari'a 
Implementation in Aceh”, in Michael Feener and Mark Cammack (eds), Islamic Law in 
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discourses on their incompatibility.10 Also, it raises the question of how 
and why did Indonesian Islamists adjust their ideologies to fit with 
democratic processes and how has the democratic process adapted to 
Islamist involvement in post-Suharto Indonesian politics?  
To address the question, the article employed a qualitative 
fieldwork in the West Javanese District of Cianjur Indonesia. Cianjur is 
a front-liner of initiation of sharia-oriented regulations at the local level 
in post-Suharto’s Indonesia. It is also a home of notable Islamist 
vigilante group, i.e, Reformist Movement of Islam (GARIS - Gerakan 
Reformis Islam) which was established in 2001. With membership 
exceeding 28.000 people and cohesive mass movement, GARIS is an 
influential political player in Cianjur. It can exert substantial political 
pressure in one way or another because of its direct link with Darul 
Islam (DI) rebellion of the 1950s in which Cianjur is one of its 
stronghold. 11  GARIS has three main programs which show 
intolerance, namely their review of draft of national penal code, 
opposition to Christian mission, and opposition to Ahmadiyah. 12 
Historically, Cianjur is one of the major bases for Darul Islam (DI), an 
Islamist rebellion in the 1950s that fought for the establishment of an 
Islamic state in Indonesia as well as basis for Masjumi party, (Majlis 
Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia - Consultative Council of Indonesian 
Muslims), one of Indonesia's main political parties during the period of 
parliamentary democracy in the 1950s-60s with Islamist persuasion. 
Finally, Cianjur is known as Kota Santri (city of pious Muslims) with 
about 99 percent Muslim population of the total three million 
                                                                                                                                      
Contemporary Indonesia: Ideas and Institutions (Boston: Islamic Legal Studies Program, 
Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 193-215 
10 See, for instance, Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order, Simon & Schuster pbk. ed (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 
1993); Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 20th Century 
(USA: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam: Holy 
War and Unholy Terror (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2004); Francis 
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989); 
Francis Fukuyama, “The West Has Won,” The Guardian, October 10, 2001, sec. World 
news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/11/afghanistan.terrorism30. 
11 Michael Buehler, The Politics of Shari‘a: Islamist Activists and the State in Democratizing 
Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 133 
12 Ratno Lukito, “Islamisation as Religious Intolerance: The Case of GARIS in Cianjur, 
West Java”, Al-Jami’ah: Journal of Islamic Studies, vol. 54, no. 2 (2016). 
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inhabitants.13 The consequence is that aspiration to implement Islam, 
albeit in different gradations and strategies is apparent in Cianjur. That 
is why they are qualified to be considered as Islamists.  
Considering such strong political Islam background, nearly all 
political parties, regardless their ideological platform, show their 
commitment to the implementation of sharia, albeit in different levels. 
In Cianjur, all major political parties are present. Interestingly, the so 
called nationalist parties such as PD, PDIP, Golkar, and later Nasdem 
get considerably more votes than the parties traditionally affiliated to 
Islam, such as PBB (Partai Bulan Bintang – Crescent and Star Party), 
PKB (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa – National Awakening Party), PAN 
(Partai Amanat Nasional – National Mandate Party), and PKS (Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera – Justice and Welfare Party). PBB, which is 
considered ideologically descendent of Masjumi, ceased to exist after 
2005 regional election due to low votes. Thus, any effort by Islamists 
to implement sharia should calculate this political configuration.  
The article is based on interview with 59 informants from different 
social groups representing government officers, researchers, political 
parties, youth organizations, and a few religious leaders of all 
acknowledged religions. 
This article discusses the co-existence of democratization and 
sharia-related regulations in Cianjur. Such a co-existence is a result of 
adaptation amongst the Islamists to work within the democratic 
political system, and in turn, the democratic system has also adapted to 
the Islamists’ aspiration of certain degree of sharia-related symbolism. 
It refutes essentialist views as represented by Huntington,14 Lewis,15 
and Fukuyama16 who perceive Islam, including shariatization, as static 
entities with fixed characteristics. The case of Cianjur has indicated 
that the so-called sharia-related regulation is a form of ‘locally 
repackaged sharia’ that blends local custom and Islam-related 
symbolism. It has the effect of not only moderating sharia to become 
more open and inclusive but also silencing critical groups of the 
nationalist and secularist groups.  
                                                                
13 Biro Pusat Statistik Cianjur, Kabupaten Cianjur dalam Angka 2017 (Cianjur: Biro Pusat 
Statistik Cianjur, 2017), p. 145 
14 Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations. 
15 Bernard Lewis, The Crisis of Islam (New York: Random House, 2004). 
16 Francis Fukuyama, “The end of history?”, The National Interest (Summer 1989), pp. 1-
18. 
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In a pluralistic society like Indonesia, where identities in terms of 
religion, ethnicity, race, and parties are frequently contested, it is 
important and reasonable to develop a democratic system that, at the 
very least, pays attention to political rights and civil liberties, but which 
also cultivates the development of an open space of articulation to 
various opinions and interests in order that the nation is not ruled by 
the few. With this in mind, the argument in this article departs from 
post-structuralist’s notion of democracy 17  that frames democracy 
should maintain ‘the social' as an open space and resist the kind of 
hegemonic closure characteristic of ‘liberal' democracy. 18  It should 
ensure the possibility of openness and the ultimately undecided 
moment of articulation, where different political groups reproduce 
commonly-bounded signification to establish coalescence. 19 
Democracy, in a pluralistic society, is coloured by radical 
indetermination whereby it is impossible to have a single perspective 
or universal point of view.20 Mouffe21 proposed an ‘agnostic pluralism' 
where politics should be to create unity in a context of conflict and 
diversity. Also, unlike Habermas' 22  deliberative democracy, which 
deemed that communicative reasons would bring consensus and thus 
eliminate conflict among different groups in democratic society, the 
post-structuralist model of democracy is of the view that disagreement 
between political groups is probably within a democratic society. 
                                                                
17 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy (London: Verso, 1985) 
18 See Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (Radford, VA : Wilder 
Publications Limited, 2012); Robert Alan Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition 
(USA: Yale University Press, 1971); R Rose, “Democratic and Undemocratic States,” 
in Democratization, ed. Christian Haerpfer et al. (Oxford: OUP Oxford, 2009); Richard 
S. Katz and Peter Mair, “Changing Models of Party Organization and Party 
Democracy The Emergence of the Cartel Party,” Party Politics 1, no. 1 (January 1, 
1995): 5–28, https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068895001001001; Dan Slater, Ordering 
Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
19  Ernesto Laclau, “Identity and Hegemony: The Role of Universality in the 
Constitution of Political Logics,” in Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary 
Dialogues on the Left, ed. Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj Žižek (Verso, 2000), 
p. 85. 
20 Mouffe, The Return of the Political, (London: Verso, 1993), p. 11. 
21 Mouffe, “Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism?”, Political Sciences Series 72, 
Institute of Advance Studies, Vienna (December 2000). 
22 Jurgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action: Reason and the Rationalization of 
Society (USA: Beacon Press, 1984). 
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Disagreement and, indeed, opposition among groups are seen as part 
of democracy and democratic processes.  
The presence of sharia symbolism, along with the development of 
democratization, is thus understood as the process where each 
contesting group will construct and draw upon symbolism, identities, 
and interests that are based on their assessment of the existent 
situation. In the Reformasi era, an era after the fall of Suharto regime 
in 1998, it is apparent that meaning and interpretation over symbolism 
and religious practices may shift when the configuration of actors also 
shifts. With this in mind, various expressions and forms of movements 
by Islamists do not necessarily have similar religious-piety orientations. 
More precisely, the driving force of Islamism has not always been 
driven by transcendental orientation. Similarly, in practical politics, 
democracy may also be used for different objectives and refer to 
various meanings as well as employing different instruments of 
mobilisation over time such as religion, ethnicity, and money. With 
respect to this, the resurgence of sharia-inspired regulation can be seen 
as taking part in a developing process of democratization in post-
Suharto.  
How is the fitted sharia possible in Cianjur West Java? This article 
finds three underpinning factors that enable the fitted sharia. First, 
Cianjur Islamists’ knowledge of sharia is open to multiple 
interpretations and practices that enables sharia to blends complex 
convergences of local cultural identities, political interest, and 
economic rationality in the increasingly contested political sphere in 
the newly developed democratization of post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Second, Cianjur is home to various civic associations and political 
groups with no single group predominating. Although the people of 
Cianjur is majority Muslims but they are affiliated to widely diverse 
religious and social organizations. Thus, those groups of difference 
have to negotiate with other over religious understanding and strategic-
ideological form of movement to exercise political power and maintain 
control over the society in general. Third, the so-called sharia has 
number of secular functions related to politics, economy, and local 
custom and value. All these eventually helped to aid the non-Islamist 
groups to accept the usage of sharia symbolism in public. 
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The Locally Fitted Sharia  
This article has found that the so-called sharia and the movement 
of shariatization have shifted from one form to the other over 
different time period. The shift took shape at the interpretation and 
knowledge about sharia as well as at the form of application of sharia. 
Initially, in the immediate period of the Reformasi (1999-2000), sharia 
is seen as a ‘God-prescription’ in dealing with all human matters and 
which held ready-to-use ‘formulas’ to deal with not only religious and 
spiritual sphere but also social, political, economic, and cultural 
issues.23 As a result, in the early Reformasi era, especially in 1999 to 
2006, the agenda of shariatization has mainly manifested in a 
formalistic form of sharia such as enforcing women head veil in the 
public life, daily recitation of the Quran, and congregation of mid-day 
prayers for the male Muslim civil servants. 
This shift can be best described with the evolution of Gerbang 
Marhamah in Cianjur, West Java.24 Gerbang Marhamah is an acronym 
for Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlaq Al-Karimah - a 
Movement for development of religiously good behavior. 25 It was a 
program to implement sharia in Cianjur which was set up in 2001 
during the term of Wasidi Swastomo as the Regent of Cianjur. 
Bureaucrat by profession, Swastomo himself is not an islamist, but he 
made promise prior local election to islamists, especially with GARIS 
to implement sharia once elected as regent of Cianjur. Among the 
main agendas of Gerbang Marhamah during his tenure were 
conducting jama’ah (congressional) prayers in workplace, especially in 
government agencies, paying alms and charity, arranging religious 
gatherings and creating Islamic environment in government agencies. 
The regent also appointed many Penyuluh Akhlaqul Karimah (PAK – 
instructor for good behavior) with the task of campaigning Gerbang 
Marhamah to Cianjur Muslim population.  
                                                                
23  Bupati Cianjur, “Apa Dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at Islam Di Kabupaten 
Cianjur: Bahan Penyuluhan Dan Sosialisasi Bagi Para Petugas Akhlaqul Karimah 
(PAK) Di Kabupaten Cianjur,” 2002; Lembaga Pengkajian & Pengembangan Islam, 
“Format Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam Di Kabupaten Cianjur” (Cianjur: Lembaga 
Pengkajian & Pengembangan Islam Kabupaten Cianjur, 2001). 
24  Amin Mudzakkir, “Islam Priangan Pergulatan Identitas dan Politik Kekuasaan”, 
Tashwirul Afkar, No. 26 (2008), pp. 78-81. 
25  Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pengembangan Islam (LPPI), Mewujudkan Masyarakat 
Cianjur Sugih MUkti Tur Islami: Sebuah Upaya melaksanakan Syari’at Isalm di Kabupaten 
Cianjur (Cianjur: LPPI, 2001). 
  
Hakimul Ikhwan 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
24 
Over shadowed by Islamists’ attacks to Ahmadiyah community, 
Muslim leaders from various Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul 
Ulama, Muhammadiyah, PUI (Persatuan Umat Islam – Muslim 
Union), Persis (Persatuan Islam – Islamic Unity) and MUI (Majelis 
Ulama Indonesia – Indonesian Council of Ulama) were behind Wasidi 
Swastomo to ensure his reelection as regent of Cianjur in the 2006 
district direct election. However, although with this full endorsement 
and political backing of Golkar party and some Islamic parties of PBB, 
PKB and PAN, he was eventually defeated by a very narrow margin to 
Tjetjep Muchtar Soleh, another secular-nationalist bureaucrat backed 
by Partai Demokrat (PD – Democrat Party).26  
The defeat of Swastomo, however, had also something to do with 
GARIS’s withdrawal from supporting him, because of his decision to 
insistence nominate a party cadre as running mate at the expense of 
GARIS head of Cianjur, Anjep Hermawan. This resulted in GARIS 
launched smear campaign against him.27 Interestingly, soon after being 
elected, the new regent believes that supporting Gerbang Marhamah is 
politically strategic. He decided to continue Gerbang Marhamah in 
2006 arguing that it is aspiration of Muslim population of Cianjur. 
There were 12 aspects of Gerbang Marhamah under this new regent, 
namely good behavior, ritual, bureaucracy, politics, education, dakwah 
(Islamic propagation), economy, social affairs, law, arts and culture.  
The shift of sharia approach by employing popular programs after 
the defeat of political Islam is commonplace elsewhere in Indonesia.28 
Thus, the case of Cianjur is not an exception. It is well adapted by 
islamists in the region. They believe that sharia is religiously more 
legitimate than democracy. Democracy is seen by the Islamists as 
merely a ‘human creation’ and thus not able to solve the problems they 
experience in the region. For instance, Harun, a senior figure of the 
Islamist Party of Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB), a small party which 
                                                                
26 Tjetjep Mochtar Sholeh was defeated by Wasidi Swastomo in 2001’s parliamentary 
election for district head with narrow margin of 22 to 21 votes. But in 2006, Wasidi 
was defeated by Tjetjep Mochtar Sholeh in district direct election also bu narrow 
margin of 43.37% to 43.08% Buehler, The Politics of Shari‘a, p. 160 and p. 165.  
27 Buehler, The Politics of Shari‘a, p. 166 
28  See for instance Moh. Nurhakim, “The New Orientation of Islamic Revivalist 
Movements in the Context of Post-Reform Indonesia”, paper presented at 4th 
International Conference the Community Development in ASEAN, Phnom Penh 
Cambodia (March 22 – 23, 2017), p. 496 
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ideologically was inspired by Masjumi, said “I do not observe the 
majority opinion [through electoral democracy] but the truth [of 
Islam/Sharia], although it is minority. Being majority is not necessarily 
the truth.” Wawan, a Local Chairman of Persatuan Umat Islam (PUI – 
Muslims Union), another islamists organization, concurred “In early 
days of the Reformasi era, there were desires [among Islamists] to urge 
sharia as a solution for problems in law enforcement. Sharia would 
solve our problems.”  
However, after local election in 2006 with the defeat of the 
candidate supported by Islamist parties and many muslim leaders, the 
interpretation and implementation of sharia have shifted to another 
form. The Islamists turn around the interpretation of the essence of 
sharia from ‘God prescription’ to ‘serving human and humanity.’ As 
Thoha, the Head of PBB of Cianjur, told: 
[In the past] we merely viewed Islam from the idealistic landscape 
that did not contribute in solving the problem of people’s social and 
economic needs. It never addressed public issues such as economy and 
health. Therefore, we now deal with these issues seriously in our 
campaign.  
The Islamists shift to promote programs channeled toward health 
service providers — hospitals and pharmacies — for people in need of 
medical treatment, especially those less privileged in remote areas and 
relatively less educated. Thoha further said: 
We provided medical services (by opening occasional free medical 
services to public). We tried to deal with the issues that had not been 
touched in the past. It is not to leave the old [symbolic-ritualism of 
sharia] but we need to make it concrete in dealing with people’s daily 
needs. This is to connect between the ideal and the real. In [the 
teaching of] Islam, the best people are the most useful to others. This 
principle should be advanced, not only in the health sector but also the 
rest including governance and bureaucracy. 
In addition, the enactment of district regulation on zakat 
management in 200429 marked this shift. In the view of the Islamists, 
the earlier sharia campaign had little implication in improving people's 
welfare and earnings. On the other hand, zakat is thus seen as a sharia-
                                                                
29 Arskal Salim, “The Islamisation of Regional Regulations and Its Impact on Good 
Governance in Contemporary Indonesia”, in Tim Lindsey, Helen Pausacker (eds), 
Religion, Law and Intolerance in Indonesia (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2016), p. 
325. 
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compatible instrument that would improve financial situation of the 
poor. This zakat regulation signified a shift from the previous agenda 
heavily oriented towards the sacred to ‘serve the God' to humanity 
issues.  
Moreover, the experience in Cianjur indicated that sharia-related 
regulation had become a nodal point which brought the contesting 
groups of the Islamists and the nationalists to came to agree upon. In 
the case of the enactment of zakat regulation, despite their maintaining 
different interests, rationalities, and interpretations of the policy is this 
the proof. For the Islamists, besides theological orientation to behave 
in accordance to sharia, zakat also has a mundane-strategic orientation 
that serves to strengthen the Islamist groups' political existence in 
Cianjur. Meanwhile, in the view of the secular-nationalist 
establishment, accommodation of the zakat regulation helps shore up 
his power via religious channels, increasing his influence, popularity, 
and electability. Moreover, although this secular-nationalist Executive 
Head agreed on zakat enforcement, it had only been enacted and 
sustained through and within the local government institutional 
system. 
 
Underpinning Factors to the Fitted Sharia 
How is the fitted sharia possible in Cianjur post-Suharto 
Indonesia? There are three answers to the question. First, what 
happens in Cianjur has indicated that sharia is a form of ‘discursive 
tradition’ of Islam that blends complex convergences of local cultural 
identities, political interest, and economic rationality in the increasingly 
contested political sphere in the newly developed democratization of 
post-Suharto Indonesia. Second, Cianjur is home to various Islamic 
civic associations and political groups with no single group 
predominating. Although the people of Cianjur is majority Muslims 
but they are affiliated to widely diverse religious and social 
organizations with also various religious persuasion. Thus, those 
groups of difference have to negotiate each other over religious 
understanding and strategic-ideological form of movement to exercise 
political power and provide what the population needs in term of 
implementation of religion in general. Third, the so-called sharia has a 
number of secular functions related to local politics, economic 
interests, and local custom and value. All these factors eventually bring 
the Islamist and the secular-nationalist groups to compromise over the 
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the usage of sharia symbolism in public. Further discussion on these 
three factors will be in the following subsections. 
 
Sharia as a Discursive Tradition of Islam  
This article argues that the fitted sharia in Cianjur is possible 
because the interpretation and knowledge of the so-called sharia are 
not a fixed and permanent but somewhat open and, indeed, negotiable 
that fluctuated in line with specific social and political contexts. It uses 
Asad’s 30  conception of ‘discursive tradition of Islam’ as it enables 
accommodation of the multiplicity interpretation and application of 
Islam, including sharia. Asad's conception is useful in highlighting 
awareness about the reproduction of religious knowledge over 
different time periods among the Islamists. The knowledge 
reproduction can be a by-product of endogenous pressure as a result 
of intensive interaction among various groups within Islam, as well as 
resulting from exogenous factors following Islamists' engagement with 
the process of democratization. In other words, the sharia and 
shariatization have to be understood as open-ended discourse and 
contingent processes. They are neither a permanent nor fixed form of 
expression or interpretation of Islam. Thus, sharia has been framed as 
a phenomenon that emerges in the ‘present,' is related to the ‘past,' and 
oriented to the ‘future.' It has linked to current religious practices and 
the contextual interpretations of the foundational texts of Islam. As 
Asad31  stated “Islam is neither a distinctive social structure nor an 
eclectic collection of beliefs, artifacts, customs, and morals. It is a 
tradition.” Here, a tradition consists essentially of discourses related to 
a particular context that shaped a form of tradition and purpose of a 
given practice. Within this frame, religious interpretation and practices 
at the local level are not perceived as ‘the less real' Islam—as in the 
orientalists' worldview 32—but rather are linked to the great tradition 
and transcendental dimension of Islam. 
The arguments used by the Cianjur Islamists to account for the 
shift is that according to their interpretation of the Hadith — the 
second source of Islam — practicing good behavior or Budi Baik is the 
                                                                
30 Talal Asad, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam”, Occasional Paper, Center for 
Contemporary Arab Studies (Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1986), p. 7. 
31 Ibid., p. 14. 
32 Edward W. Said, Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd, 1978). 
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primary goal of the prophethood of Muhammad. This is concluded 
from a hadith narrated by Bukhari and others which reported the 
Prophet Muhammad once said: “verily I (Muhammad) was sent to realize 
good behavior (of mankind).”33 According some islamists in Cianjur, the 
main indicator of success in performing good behavior is observing 
sharia. They maintain that this hadith promote ‘good behavior’ while 
still remaining in line with the basic principles of sharia.  
The Islamists argument above suggest that the shift in the form of 
interpretation and application of shariatization is not to suggest that 
sharia has lost its connection with the sacred texts — Qur'an, Hadith, 
and Islamic jurisprudence — and the traditions of Islam, but that these 
connections are subject to multiple reinterpretations. The shift has 
gained significance since the Cianjur’s Islamists believe that the main 
cause of the Indonesian economic crisis of the late 1990s is rooted in 
the problem of crises in akhlaq (morality), and thus the promotion of 
Akhlaq al-Karimah (noble morality or good behavior) would be the sole 
solution to the crises, as well as a way of preventing what they saw as 
the threats to local culture, morality, and values in the future 34. 
The shift in the forms of application of sharia from the 
‘formalistic' to the ‘substantive' sharia indicates an increasing awareness 
of the necessity to articulate Islamic teachings and doctrines in dealing 
with welfare issues. The increasing awareness is, of course, not always 
driven by the spirit of religiosity and piousness for the sacred 
orientation, but is also shaped by pragmatic orientations related to 
contestation over political power and economic resources at the local 
level in Cianjur. This development illustrates that making Islam more 
immediately and explicitly beneficial to the betterment of human life 
does not necessarily mean that the promotion of Islamism-related 
identity and symbolism is abandoned.  
Also, the discursive sharia has manifested in the fact that the 
manifestation of Sharia is incredibly diverse and multifaceted. In Sunni 
                                                                
33 This hadith is narrated by Ahmad ibn hanbal in his hadith collection al-Musnad, vol 
2, number 381. Read Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Al- Musnad (Cairo: Dar al-Hadith, 1995).  
34 Lembaga Pengkajian & Pengembangan Islam (LPPI), “Gerbang Marhamah Gerakan 
Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah Kabupaten Cianjur: Rencana Strategis 
Mewujudkan Masyarakat Cianjur Sugih Mukti Yang Islami” (Cianjur: Lembaga 
Pengkajian & Pengembangan Islam, 2002); LPPI, “Perjalanan Gerbang Marhamah 
(Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah) Tahap 1 (Pertama) Periode 
5 Tahun 1422 H/2001 M - 1436 H/2005 M” (Cianjur: Lembaga Pengkajian & 
Pengembangan Islam, 2005). 
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tradition, for instance, there are four equally orthodox schools of law 
such as the Hanafi, named after Abu Hanifa (d. 767); the Maliki, 
named after Malik b. Anas (d. 795); the Shafi'I, named after Shafi'i 
(d.820); and the Hambali, named after Ahmad b Hanbal (d. 855).35 The 
majority of Indonesian Muslims, for instance, are traditionally Sunni of 
the Shafi'i Mazhab36  but there is a broader diversity of Indonesian 
Islam that includes groups such as the traditionalist Nahdatul Ulama, 
or the modernist Muhammadiyah and PERSIS.  
Regarding Sharia, there are groups within Indonesian Muslims who 
object the application of it because of the association to the practice of 
Arabian Muslims. In their view, the practice of sharia in the Arabian 
Muslims was not necessarily applicable to the Indonesian Muslims.37 
This group is very critical to forming of sharia that, in their view, is an 
expression of Arab Muslims rather than Indonesian Muslims.38 The 
substantial characteristic that differentiates Indonesian Muslims to the 
Arabian Muslims is the fact that Indonesia is a pluralistic society and 
having a different historical background of the coming of Islam. 39 
Also, many Indonesian Muslims also opposes sharia literal 
interpretation of criminal law with its primitive punishments such as 
hand amputation, death penalty, and stoning. 40  These indicate that 
                                                                
35 Gerhard Böwering, Patricia Crone, and Mahan Mirza, The Princeton Encyclopedia of 
Islamic Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 498 . 
36 Robert W. Hefner, “Religion: Evolving Pluralism”, in Indonesia Beyond Suharto: Polity, 
Economy, Society, Transition, ed. Donald K. Emmerson (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999); 
Kecia Ali, Imam Shafi’i: Scholar and Saint (England: Oneworld Publications, 2011). 
37  Martin van Bruinessen, “Ghazwul Fikri or Arabization? Indonesian Muslim 
Responses to Globalization”, in Ken Miichi, Omar Farouk (eds), Southeast Asian 
Muslims in the Era of Globalization (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmilan, 2015), p. 61 
38  See for instance, Abdurrahman Wahid, Pergulatan Negara, Agama, dan Kebudayaan 
(Jakarta: Desantara, 2001). 
39 Anthony Reid, Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce, 1450-1680: Volume 2, Expansion 
and Crisis, Reprint edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995); Robert W. 
Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (New York: Princeton 
University Press, 2000); Robert W. Hefner, “Islam in an Era of Nation-State: Politics 
and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia,” in Islam in an Era of Nation-States: 
Politics and Religious Renewal in Muslim Southeast Asia, ed. Robert W. Hefner and Patricia 
Horvatich (University of Hawaii Press, 1997), pp. 3-42. 
40  See for Instance, Nur Rofi’ah and Imam Nahe’i, Kajian tentang Hukum dan 
Penghukuman dalam Islam: Konsep Ideal Hudud dan Praktiknya (Jakarta: Komnas 
Perempuan, 2016).  
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sharia is not a fixed and single form of application and indeed open to 
influence by sociological, cultural, historical, and political contexts. 
 
Diverse Social Group with No Single Group Predominating  
Another factor enables the fitted sharia is because political 
processes in Cianjur are flexible enough to accommodate and engage 
different groups. Cianjur is home to some diverse civic associations 
and political groups, both the Islamists and the nationalists, with no 
single group predominating. Moreover, Islamic groups are far from 
unified on this issue. Although Nahdatul Ulama is the major cultural 
expression of the Muslim people in Cianjur, but it is an organization 
no bigger and more membership than Persatuan Islam, 
Muhammadiyah, or Persatuan Umat Islam. 
Likewise, Islam-associated parties are divided into several parties 
that reflect different schools of thought, cultures of religiosity, and 
political preference. 41  Although these party have seemingly similar 
agenda on shariatization in Cianjur, their pragmatic political goals 
certainly different. They also rely on different mass bases. Partai Bulan 
Bintang, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, and Partai Amanat Nasional usually 
have membership of modernist as well as islamist Muslims with 
apparent aspiration to implement sharia through political avenues. On 
the other hand, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa PPP—Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan) have mass bases of traditional muslims which put less 
emphasis on sharia implementation. Meanwhile, the secular-
nationalists are also divided into numbers of political parties such as 
the Golkar Party (Golongan Karya), Democrat Party (Partai 
Demokrat), Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP—Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan), and the fast growing Nasional 
Demokrat Party (Nasdem - National Democrat Party).  
However, during political races, these parties often form coalitions 
beyond their ideological platforms. For instance, in the 2015 local 
direct election, there are two political coalitions in which each coalition 
was formed from nationalist-secular parties and islamist parties. Irvan 
Rivano Muchtar-Herman Suherman, who later won the election were 
                                                                
41 Zachary Abuza, Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia (New York: Routledge, 2007); 
Rachel Rinaldo, Mobilizing Piety: Islam and Feminism in Indonesia (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2013); Robert W Hefner, “Islam and Nation in the Post Suharto 
Era”, in The Politics of Post Suharto Indonesia, ed. Adam Schwarz and Jonathan Paris (New 
York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), pp. 40-72. 
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backed by a secular-nationalist party of Partai Golkar and two islamist 
parties of Partai Bulan Bintang and Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa. In the 
opposite side, Suranto-Aldwin Rahadian were supported by five 
secular nationalist parties of PDI Perjuangan, Hanura, Gerindra, 
NasDem, and Partai Demokrat and three islamist parties of PAN, 
PKS, PPP.42 
Therefore, the political articulations of those Islamist and 
nationalist groups which are supposedly prone to disagreement on 
many ideological and strategic issues between and within them in 
existing arrangements, do not take place or at least do not create much 
tension or even conflict. This fluid as well as pragmatic approach to 
ideology is able to contain and even reach compromises upon 
particular policies and agendas. Here, democracy is to maintain ‘the 
social' as an open space coloured by the persistence of conflict and 
disagreement, whereby it is impossible to have a single perspective or 
universal point of view. Throughout conflict and disagreement, 
different contesting groups could maintain compromise and coalition, 
although the compromise and contestation did not necessarily become 
permanent as it is open to change, following the dynamics of local 
political developments and agenda.43 Within this frame, the persistence 
of sharia-related symbolism in post-Islamists' electoral failure of 2005 
could not be understood merely in the frame of politics of inclusion. 
Rather, the ruling group— mainly the secular nationalists—and the 
ruled group—the Islamists—following the 2005 election, held a 
relatively equal position and influence over local politics in Cianjur. 
Within this mutual influence and exchange of interests, the contesting 
groups adjusted and adapted their ideologies and strategies to fit with 
one another.  
Moreover, although Islam is the majority religion and religious life 
is salient, political Islam has not been as strong as Muslim culture in 
Cianjur. Since the independence of Indonesia in 1945, the Islamist 
politics was much less influential in Cianjur. Although Cianjur had 
influential Ulama or any kind of muslim leadership who had 
reasonable contribution during armed resistance against colonialism in 
pre-independent Indonesia, none of those Islamist figures became 
                                                                
42  Republika Online, Pilkada Cianjur Tjetjep Mochtar-Dadang Supianto Pasangan 
PKS-Partai Demokrat, http://www.republika.co.id/Online_detail.asp?id=222054&ka-
t_id=23, accessed on 20 November 2005 
43 Laclau and Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, p. 22 
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involved in local politics or served as top range bureaucrats in the early 
period of independent Indonesia. At that time, there were 17 districts 
in the West Java region, but none of the Ulama gained a position of 
Head of District. The posts were all served by the proponents of 
Soekarno’s Indonesian National Party (PNI - Partai National 
Indonesia). Even in the first general election of 1955, Masyumi got 
fewer votes than the PNI in Cianjur. The story was even worse in the 
following decades of Suharto’s New Order era when Islamist parties 
lost significant numbers of constituents. This trend continues in the 
post-Suharto era of 1998 when the Islamist parties were even outside 
of the big three list parties in Cianjur. 
All Islamic-Islamist parties in four consecutive general elections of 
post-Suharto period (1999, 2004, 2009, and 2014) saw significant 
declines in popular votes from 39.7 percent in 1999 to 36.2 and 29.2 in 
2004 and 2009 respectively, but then slightly increased to 30.3 percent 
in 2014. Out of the five Islam-based parties, only the PKS had 
constantly increased their share of votes in the last four elections of 
post-Suharto. In comparison to the secular-nationalist parties, the total 
votes of Islam-based parties were much fewer than the nationalist 
parties such as the Golkar, PDIP, and Demokrat Party in all four 
elections of post-Suharto. The failure of Islam-based parties had 
rooted in the first-ever 1955 general election of the republic when the 
Islam-based parties (the Nahdatul Ulama and the Masyumi) obtained 
fewer votes than the nationalist of Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI). 
Under the New Order of Suharto (1966-1998), Islam-based parties lost 
significant numbers of constituents, and even worse in post Suharto 
era when the Islam-based parties (the Islamic and Islamist parties)44 
where outside of the big three list parties in Cianjur (Partai Golkar, 
PDIP and Partai Demokrat). 
The unconsolidated political Islamism in Cianjur is because 
Muslims were affiliated with widely diverse social organisations. 
Although Cianjur's cultural religiosity is predominantly traditional and 
therefore resembles practices of the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), the 
                                                                
44  The Islamist parties refer to the Crescent and Star Party (PBB—Partai Bulan 
Bintang) and the United Development Party (PPP—Partai Persatuan Pembangunan) 
as they have formally stated that Islam is the basic principle of the party, instead of 
Pancasila. The Islamic parties refer to the Justice and Prosperous Party (PKS—Partai 
Keadilan Sejahtera), the National Awakening Party (PKB—Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa), and the National Mandate Party (PAN—Partai Amanat Nasional) as they are 
based on Pancasila as a party principle, although their major constituents are Muslims. 
  
Fitted Sharia in Democratizing Indonesia 
33 JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
registered members and the formal branches of the NU are very 
insignificant in Cianjur. The number is much less than two modernist 
muslims organizations; Persatuan Islam and Muhammadiyah. It is 
because the people identified themselves as (culturally) NU, without 
submitting to the organization and formal structure of the NU, neither 
linked to its affiliated political parties — PKB and PPP.  
The local elites—both the Islamists and secular nationalists— still 
need to employed symbolism related to shariatization in particular and 
religious-related issues, in general, to establish Islamic credentials and 
thus supposedly attract constituency support prior to an election. In 
other words, the mobilization of sharia-related symbolism does not 
necessarily relate to promoting Islamic piety and law but is used by 
some individuals and political groups to provide lucrative ‘protection' 
services for local businesses and neighborhoods.45 The adoption of 
shariatization strategy could have also been a result of heightened 
political competition among elites in localities, especially to secure 
political positions. In this regard, the elites who run for candidacy are 
compelled to compromise with the Islamists in those localities as the 
Islamists maintained powerful local networks through religious 
organizations, especially the pesantrens (Islamic boarding schools). 
From this form of relationship, the majority of sharia-related 
regulations are enacted in localities with political support from ‘secular' 
executive heads who had no direct-formal and personal affiliation with 
Islamist parties but rather belonged to the nationalist-secular parties 
(i.e., the Party of Golkar and PDIP), New Order military, or civilian 
bureaucracy.  
At the provincial level, eight out of 34 provinces had adopted at 
least one sharia regulation between 1999 and 2009. The Islamist Party 
of PPP gathered a plurality of votes in one province (Aceh), whereas in 
the rest provinces the secular nationalist party of the Golkar and the 
PDIP won either through winning the majority of votes or through a 
plurality of votes. Here, the term of ‘a plurality of votes' refers to a 
coalition of multi-parties whereas the term ‘majority' refers to a single 
dominant party's vote. Meanwhile, at the district and municipality 
levels in the same period (1999-2009), among the 54 (out of 497) 
districts and municipalities, they had adopted at least one sharia-
inspired regulation. The Islam-based party of PAN collected a majority 
                                                                
45 Robert W. Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, The Review of Faith 
& International Affairs 10, no. 4 (2012), pp. 61-69,  
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of votes in two districts, and the Islamist PPP collected a plurality of 
votes in five districts. In the other districts and municipalities, the 
Golkar party won the majority in five districts and municipalities and, 
in a plurality, the other thirty-one districts, whereas the PDIP won a 
plurality of votes in only eight districts. In those provinces and 
districts/municipalities, 69.4 per cent of executive heads were 
previously connected with the New Order military or civilian 
bureaucracy or the secular Golkar party.46  
 
The Secular Function of the Sharia 
The co-existence of shariatization and democratic processes in 
Cianjur is also related to the fact that sharia has a number of mundane 
functions in politics, economy, and culture. Regarding politics, the 
adoption of shariatization have been a result of heightened political 
competition in the localities, especially to win the local political 
positions. In this regard, the elites who run for candidacy need to 
compromise with the Islamists in those localities as the Islamists 
maintained powerful local networks through religious organizations, 
especially the pesantrens, traditional Islamic boarding schools. These 
pesantrens are often led by charismatic teacher and clerics with many 
faithful followers which give them political leverage.47 In other words, 
sharia-inspired regulation, including the policy of zakat, is not always 
driven by the religious principle of Islamism but it is also shaped by a 
political orientation that employ sharia symbolism as a political 
commodity for use in reinforcing Islamic credentials.48 Shariatization in 
particular and religious-related issues, in general, has been used by local 
elites as a means to establish Islamic credentials and thus supposedly 
attract constituency support in the election. Here, Shariatization 
produced a form of symbolism that can be employed by the contesting 
groups amidst democratization to win political goals. Thus, the 
mobilization of sharia-related symbolism does not necessarily relate to 
promoting Islamic piety and law but is used by some Islamist groups 
to provide lucrative ‘protection' services for local businesses and 
                                                                
46 Buehler, “Subnational Islamization through Secular Parties.” 
47 For an account of the clerics’ role in politic, please refer to a classic work of Clifford 
Geertz entitled “The Javanese Kijaji: The Changing Role of a Cultural Broker”, 
Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1960), pp. 228-249. 
48  cf. Platzdasch, Islamism in Indonesia: Politics in the Emerging Democracy  (Singapore: 
ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute. 2009). 
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neighborhoods.49 As a result, sharia-related regulations are enacted in 
localities with political support from ‘secular' executive heads who has 
no direct-formal affiliation with Islamist parties but rather belong to 
the nationalist-secular parties (i.e., Partai Golkar and PDIP), New 
Order military, or civilian bureaucracy. 
There are two arguments related to why the secular-affiliated 
politicians support and enact many shariatization policies. First, 
support by the secular-affiliated politicians is possible because 
institutionalization of political parties is weak and this eventually 
enforced a running candidate to rely on the role of power brokers to 
help them win election. Here, the power brokers refer to groups or 
individuals who are able to mobilize their networks and religious 
credentials for popular votes in the election. Sharia has provided 
symbolism that could be used by those brokers to attract public 
attention and political support among religious elites who maintained 
networks to the pesantrens. Second, in the high levels of competition 
in an election, a candidate will not only need to have strong economic 
capital (money) to fund his or her political campaign, but also cultural 
capital related to cultural goods and symbols as well as social capital 
related to powerful acquaintances and networks. 50 
Admittedly, seculars' support for sharia-inspired regulations is not 
a typical phenomenon of the post-Suharto era. During the Suharto era, 
especially from the late 1980s to 1990s, Suharto had enacted policies 
that allowed the establishment of the Sharia-based Bank Mu'amalat. He 
also approached muslim organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and 
Muhammadiyah as well as allowed the formation of Indonesian 
muslim intellectual association (ICMI – Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim 
Indonesia) in the early 1990a. Suharto also allowed Muslim schoolgirls 
to wear Muslim dress in schools.51 Those policies, however, are not 
simply intended to support Muslims’ political cause, but rather to 
strengthen the political legitimacy of the regime, at least in the eyes of 
Muslims, particularly the Ulama. 
                                                                
49 Hefner, “Shari‘a Politics and Indonesian Democracy”, p. 62. 
50 Buehler, The Politics of Shari‘a, p. 24.. 
51 Please refer to Robert Hefner’s work entitled Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization 
in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) which provides an insight 
into the changing nature of political alliances in the final years of the Suharto era when 
he tried to reach out Muslims for political support. 
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Also, symbolism of Sharia has been reflected in Islamic 
philanthropy, not only amongst Islamists but also secular-nationalists. 
In the late 1990s, Indonesian economy was in collapse, as reflected by 
the Gross Domestic Product dropping 15 percent in 1998 from an 
annual average growth of about 7 percent in the seven years since 
1990. 52  It was exacerbated by the fact that, since the devastating 
economic crisis of 1998, poverty and unemployment rates dramatically 
increased. The number of poor people more than doubled in a few 
years from about 22 million in 1996 to 49.5 million in 1999. In many 
areas of the world, very impoverished people are also very religious. 
One could say that poverty makes it more likely that people turn to 
religion–and perhaps more fundamental versions of it—because it can 
provide some security and meaning to chaotic lives. 53  The Gallup 
survey indicated religiosity has been highest in the world's poorest 
nations, and there is a tendency that the higher the income, the lower 
the importance of religion in people's life.54 Thus, the cure of poverty 
from religious values is a strategic combinantion. In Islam, zakah 
(obligatory alms) potentially plays important role.  
Zakah, or zakat in Indonesian pronunciation, is part of the five 
pillars of Islam, and in Pakistan55 and Bahrain,56 for instance, it has 
reduced income inequality. In Cianjur, it was observed that the 
issuance of the Zakat policy is not only of the interest of the Islamists 
but also the secular nationalists. Indeed, the policy was implemented 
under the nationalist-led Executive Head (2006-2011). Through the 
Zakat policy the nationalists shored up their power and maintained 
religious channels to increase their electability. The funds collected 
                                                                
52 Jonathan Temple, “Growing into Trouble: Indonesia After 1966,” CEPR Discussion 
Paper (C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers, 2001), http://ideas.repec.org/p/cpr/ceprdp/29-
32.html; Thomas B. Pepinsky, Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: 
Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009). 
53 H. Burke, “Ideology and the material culture of life and death”, in M. Hall and S.W. 
Silliman (eds), Historical Archeology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing), pp. 128-146. 
54 Steve Crabtree, “Religiosity Highest in World’s Poorest Nations: United States Is 
among the Rich Countries That Buck the Trend,” August 31, 2010, 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/142727/religiosity-highest-world-poorest-nations.aspx. 
55 Geoffrey A Jehle, “Zakat and Inquality: Some Evidence Form Pakistan”, Review of 
Income and Wealth Series 40, Number 2 (June 1994): pp. 205-16. 
56 Hisyam Abdelbaki, “The Impact of Zakat on Poverty and Income Inequality in 
Bahrain”, Review of Integrative Business & Economics 2(1) (2013): pp. 133-54. 
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from the zakat are expected to support economic activities of small 
businesses as well as to provide survival assistance for needy people 
and other designated groups of recipients, 57  according to classical 
Islamic law.58 Regardless the under performance of zakah management 
in Cianjur,59 and the success rate of poverty eradication is still low, the 
policy itself has served positive political image building for secular-
nationalists politicians in Cianjur. 
Last but not least, the emergence of sharia-related symbolism is 
also associated with a collection of principle values related to culture 
and custom.60 In Indonesian society, it is almost impossible to separate 
culture and custom from religion.61 In this regard, there are many local 
values of the people that are compatible and associated to the teaching 
of Islam and eventually have been constructed as synonymous with the 
adat (local customs, social habits, or practice). The process of mixture 
or acculturation of Islam and the adat has been taking place since 
Islam started to take root in Indonesia in around the fourteenth 
century.62 The ‘nick name' of Cianjur as a Kota Santri (City of Pious 
Muslims) has indicated that the adat and symbolism of Islam have, for 
                                                                
57 According to the Quran (9:60), there are eight designated groups of recipients of 
zakat, namely the poor (al-fuqara), the needy (al-masaakin), the collectors of zakat, newly 
converts, (freeing) slaves, those overburdened with debts, workers in God's way (fi-
sabilillah), and wayfarers (ibn-sabil) 
58 In Indonesia, the management of zakah (both collection and distribution) has been 
regulated through the Law No. 38 Year 1999 and amended by Law No. 23 Year 2011. 
In respect of this, management of the zakat is run by both the semi-state body of the 
Alms-giving Body (BAZ-Badan Amil Zakat) and the Local Government, under the 
Office of Social Welfare (Kesejahteraan Rakyat). The BAZ would allocate funds to 
support small businesses or the so-called informal sector of the economy. 
59 See for instance, annual report from Cianjur Bureau of Statiscic (BPS – Biro Pusat 
Statistik), from 2008 to 2017 which shows that the target of zakah collection could not 
be met. Biro Pusat Statistik Cianjur, Kabupaten Cianjur dalam Angka 2015 (Cianjur: Biro 
Pusat Statistik Cianjur, 2015), pp. 44-49.  
60  Arskal Salim, Challenging the Secular State the Islamization of Law in Modern Indonesia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008), pp. 12-15. 
61 An outdated yet widely cited anthropological account on the relationship between 
Islam and culture in Java is Clifford Geertz’s The Religion of Java (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1960). Similar account, but in Sumatera is provided by Taufik 
Abdullah’s article entitled “Adat and Islam: An Examination of Conflict in 
Minangkabau”, Indonesia, no. 2 (Oct., 1966), pp. 1-24 
62 Merle Ricklefs, A History of Modern Indonesia since 1200 C (Hampshire: Palgrave, 2001) 
third edition, pp. 3-6. 
  
Hakimul Ikhwan 
JOURNAL OF INDONESIAN ISLAM 
Volume 12, Number 01, June 2018 
38 
a long time, blended. This local adat helped to aid non-Muslim groups 
to accept the symbolism of sharia in public. Mr. Ketut, a leader of 
Cianjur Hindu community, stated "All religions are promoting akhlaq 
al-karimah (good behaviors). It is just simply adopted from Arabic, 
which means thoughtfulness, politeness, and morality. So, we could 
accept it."  
Therefore, interpretation and forms of application of sharia are not 
merely determined by the Islamic orthodox doctrines and teachings. It 
is well observed in the District of Cianjur, for instance, that the sharia-
related regulation is remarkably adaptive and accommodative. Or more 
precisely, its form and symbol are subject to its conformity to the 
Constitution of Indonesia, which is non-theological. 63  It is thus a 
moderate form of sharia that is developed in response to heightened 
suspicions and resistance from the local, national and global critics of 
what they saw as the Islamization of Indonesia. 
The emergence of the symbolism of Islam, including those related 
to sharia, is rooted in the social composition of Cianjur that has 
maintained a strong cultural association with Islam. The wearing of 
jilbab (women head scarfs), for instance, has not merely associated with 
Islam but also the adat. Since it has become a custom, certain non-
Muslims willingly wear it. Ms. Musiyem, a Cianjur person who happens 
to be a Catholic, wears head scarf in her daily activities, including in 
her work as a teacher at a public elementary school. She reveals that 
that she and her family members are familiar with the head veil and 
other Islam-related symbols. Musiyem states that she has grown up in 
the so-called "Pancasila Family"—the term often used in Indonesia to 
denote a family, mostly an extended family, where the members 
belonged to different religious beliefs.64 Her life experience has thus 
enabled her to develop a personal capacity to adjust herself to the 
wearing of a head scarf as some of her family members are Muslims 
and wearing them.  
Musiyem's experience of wearing a Muslim Women's head veil can 
also be seen as a proof that human being are social animals and have a 
strong desire to conform to those around them. As Musiyem has 
                                                                
63  Bupati Cianjur, “Apa Dan Bagaimana Pelaksanaan Syari’at; LPPI, “Gerbang 
Marhamah Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Berakhlakul Karimah; LPPI, “Format 
Dasar Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam. 
64 Suhadi, “I Come from a Pancasila Family”: A Discursive Study on Muslim-Christian Identity 
Transformation in Indonesian Post-Reformasi Era (Zu rich: LIT Verlag, 2014). 
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grown in the "Pancasila Family," which allowed her to be intensely 
exposed to a Muslim dress code, she is then familiar with this and 
adopts it. Therefore, it is important to note that in Indonesian society 
it is almost impossible to separate culture and custom from religion.65 
Disregarding the part played by culture and custom in the 
development of shariatization will lead to misunderstanding the whole 
picture of the resurgence of sharia-related regulations. 
 
Conclusion 
The instigation of the sharia-related regulations in Cianjur is 
another case that challenge the incompatibility argument to ‘fitting 
through’ relationship between Islam and democracy. In the frame of 
incompatibility argument, the development of democracy would 
undermine Islamism, including shariatization, and vice versa. What 
unfolded in Cianjur, however, the resurgence of the sharia-inspired 
regulations is a product of, and thus fitting through, democratic 
political processes that engaged together with the elected legislative 
body and the executive office as well as various social groups at the 
local. this is possible because sharia has discursive elements that enable 
it to be fitted or repackaged amidst negotiation between different civic 
groups. The fact that Cianjur, as elsewhere in Indonesia, is home to 
Islamic groups as well as secular-nationalists, which compels them to 
negotiate political aspirations. As the so-called sharia has secular 
functions related to political alliance, economic interests, and local 
custom and values, reaching acceptable platform is not beyond 
realization.[] 
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